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1. Introduction
Generally speaking, Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty
prohibits agreements and concerted practices (hereinafter
jointly referred to as “agreements”), which have as their
object or effect the restriction of competition to the
extent that the agreement appreciably affects trade
between Member States. An agreement, which meets
these criteria, is automatically void (i.e. it cannot be
enforced), cfr. Article 81(2), unless the parties to the
agreement have notified it to the European Commission
and requested an individual exemption under Article
81(3) and the Commission grants the exemption because
it finds that the agreement meets the conditions set out
in Article 81(3).1 Article 82 prohibits abuses of a dominant
position within the EU or a significant part of it and
which affects trade between Member States. There is no
possibility for an exemption under Article 82. While the
Commission as well as national competition authorities
and courts can apply Articles 81(1) – (2) and Article 82,
presently the Commission has the exclusive power to
grant exemptions under Article 81(3).2
In September 2000, the European Commission
presented a proposal for a Council Regulation on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereinafter “the
Proposal”).3 The Proposal constitutes a step in the reform
process launched by the Commission in 1999 by its
“White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules
implementing Articles 85 and 86”4 [now Articles 81 and
82] (hereinafter, the “1999 White Paper”) and introduces
fundamental changes to the present system of en-
forcement of the EC competition rules, in particular the
two changes mentioned below:
Firstly, the obligation to notify an agreement or
business practice to the Commission, which presently is
a condition for obtaining an exemption under Article
81(3) of the EC Treaty, is proposed to be abolished.
Consequently, agreements which satisfy the conditions
of Article 81(3) are valid and enforceable ab initio with
no administrative decision being required.5 Secondly,
the Proposal introduces a directly applicable exception
system, whereby the Commission will no longer be
exclusively empowered to grant exemptions under
Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.6 Rather, national
competition authorities and courts (hereinafter jointly
referred to as “decision-making bodies”) are empowered
to decide whether the conditions of Article 81(3) are
satisfied each time they apply 81(1).7
Put simply, if the Council adopts the Proposal in its
present form, the result will be a decentralisation whereby
the day-to-day application of EC competition law in
relatively simple and straightforward cases will be
transferred to the national decision-making bodies. The
Commission’s overall objective with the Proposal
appears to be to liberate own resources in order to focus
on complicated cases which significantly affect inter-
Community trade.
If put into practice, the Proposal will have a significant
impact on the day-to-day application and enforcement
of the EC competition rules in general, and in particular
on the role of the national decision-making bodies:
Whereas national decision-making bodies have so far
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relatively rarely found themselves confronted with the
situation of having to apply the EC competition rules
(due to the obligation to notify agreements in order to
obtain exemptions and the Commission’s monopoly to
grant exemptions pursuant to Article 81(3) of the EC
Treaty), in the future they will, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, be the first instance faced with
competition law disputes; and in such cases reviewed by
the national courts, the role of the Commission will be
reduced to the one of an amicus curiae, which means that
it may guide the courts through difficult cases by
submitting its opinion in written or oral form.8 With
regard to cases handled by the national competition
authorities, the latter must consult the Commission
before adopting certain types of decisions.9 The main
exceptions to this will be severe antitrust infringements
(e.g. “hardcore cartels” and certain types of cooperation
arrangements and joint ventures) with Community-
wide significance, where the Commission will continue
to play an important role.
While the Commission’s proposal has received what
can only be categorised as a “carefully positive”
reception by most of the Member States following the
Industry and Energy Council meeting on 5 December
2000, many mainly German and British observers have
expressed serious concerns about the proposal and the
risks it gives rise to with
regard to a reduction of
legal certainty for in-
dustry and trade.10
The authors to this
article do not intend to
review technical or
procedural specificities
of the Commission’s
reform plans; nor do we
take a position whether
further decentralisation
is the most appropriate
way forward. Rather, the aim of this article is to discuss
whether the timing for such a reform is appropriate based
on legal certainty considerations. For this purpose, we
will provide examples showing that presently, the
answers to certain legal questions of EC competition
rules are vague or contradictory.
Under a decentralised application system of the EC
antitrust rules, uncertainties in the interpretation of law
would bear the danger that decision-making bodies,
located in different Member States with different judicial
traditions and with differing understanding of and
emphasis on competition policy, might decide similar
cases in dissimilar ways. The basis for this concern is
present already today, and it will likely only increase in
the future in connection with the enlargement of the EU.
This would be contrary to one of the main principles
established by the European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”)
on various occasions, namely the need for consistent
and uniform application of the competition rules.11
While the Commission is well aware of this problem,
it is, however, optimistic enough to suggest that the
frequent application of the same law and policy will, in
itself, promote consistency throughout the Single
Market.12
2. The Article 234 Procedure – Preliminary
Rulings
When the Commission refers to promoting consistency
(and with it: legal certainty) through the frequent
application of the EC competition rules, it appears to
have the regime of preliminary rulings under Article 234
[ex Article 177] of the EC Treaty in mind.13 Under
Article 234, national courts can (and, in some cases,
must) submit questions to the ECJ on the interpretation
of Community legislation. The main purpose of this
procedure is to provide national courts with guidance
and thereby prevent them from ruling in ways which are
contrary to the Treaties’ provisions (and, in effect, the
case law of the ECJ) in order to ensure uniform application
of Community law throughout the European Union.
The Commission’s optimism appears to be based on
the assumption that national courts are well aware of
Community law and procedures available to them, and
that they will make use of them. At the same time, the
Commission rejects fears that decentralisation of
application and enforcement powers will increase the
number of procedures under Article 234 of the EC
Treaty. It takes the view
that a potential sig-
nificant increase of
preliminary ruling pro-
ceedings will be only
of an initial nature, as it
expects that most liti-
gation before the
national courts will
concern areas where the
law has already been
clearly established.14
However, a review
of the development of questions concerning competition
cases brought before the ECJ under Article 234 of the EC
Treaty gives another impression. The review shows a
very uneven distribution of Article 234-cases among
the Member States from which the cases originate as well
as an almost steadily increasing number of Article 234
requests from the first preliminary rulings in the early
1960s till today.15 This development is not surprising.
National courts have increasingly requested guidance
from the ECJ for a number of reasons: Firstly, the ECJ has
consistently prescribed that the whole economic context
of any given agreement has to be taken into consideration
when assessing its lawfulness.16 Secondly, new business
models have been – and will continue to be – continuous
evolving (e.g. the arrival of franchising and the coming
of e-business). And thirdly, the application environment
of the EC competition rules is constantly changing (e.g.
through structural changes to the various markets due to
mergers and acquisitions and through the accession of
new Member States to the EU). The ECJ’s rulings are,
therefore, often not of a general nature but rather
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guidelines to the inquiring national court on how to
solve the specific case under review. For these reasons,
it would appear doubtful whether the Commission can
rely on the Article 234-procedure as an appropriate and
efficient tool to create or increase legal certainty.
Another concern in this context is the length of time
that is likely to pass from the commencement of a given
business practice until a procedure before a national
court is opened to clarify the lawfulness of the practice.
And after this, it will normally take years until questions
are referred to the ECJ and it eventually rules on them.
Industry and independent lawyers have expressed fears
that the Article 234-procedure is too lengthy, costly and
tedious to ensure legal certainty.17 In this context, it
would appear appropriate to take a look across the
Atlantic Ocean at the concerns expressed on the American
antitrust enforcement: Recent surveys show that there is
a big problem of efficiency in that parties, who are
considering to bring legal action against a competitor
or supplier, etc., for breach of the antitrust rules have to
invest considerable time and money in determining the
relevant market(s), the parties’ market positions, and to
demonstrate the other party’s unlawful conduct; and all
this, while still having to fear losing the trial. These
factors tend to cause an unwillingness among violated
parties to make full use of the legal antitrust instruments
available to them and, instead, to encourage them to
engage in unlawful business practices.18 Adopting an
enforcement system introducing what could be seen as
similar conditions as those prevailing in the United
States might cause similar difficulties in the EU.
3. Competition Policies and Guidelines
As noted above in the introduction, the Commission
suggests that the frequent application of the same law
and policy will promote consistency throughout the
EU. However, when reviewing the Proposal, one could
be led to believe that the Commission is not fully
convinced of its own view that decentralised competition
law application will
lead to this, since it
intends to shape its
policies by issuing new
guidelines and block
exemptions.19 While
such measures should,
normally, help to in-
crease legal certainty,
this will be the case only
if such guidelines and
block exemptions are
precise, clear and easy-
to-handle. In the follow-
ing, we will briefly
review past experiences and recent developments in
three important areas to see, whether notices, block
exemptions and jurisprudence provide a sufficient
degree of legal certainty to overrule the above mentioned
concerns about the timing of the proposed reform of the
implementation of the EC competition rules.
3.1 The de minimis Doctrine
Under the de minimis doctrine, agreements of minor
importance should not be prohibited under Article 81
(1) and (2) of the EC Treaty, even if it is clear that they
result in a restraint of competition. The main reason for
this is that decision-making bodies should not be
confronted with business practices which will affect
competition and the parties in a given market only to a
very limited extent; this reduces the administrative
workload and allows the law enforcing authorities to
focus on cases which are more likely to cause severe
harm and damage. Another reason is that small and
medium-sized undertakings should be able to strengthen
their position which might, in turn, have positive effects
on the economic situation in general.20
3.1.1 The non-binding character
In 1970, the Commission published the first Notice on
Agreements of Minor Importance.21 Since then, the
Commission has – with irregular intervals – published
updated versions of the notice, latest in 1997.22 With
these notices, the Commission has aimed at clarifying
to contracting parties when an agreement would be
regarded as fulfilling the de minimis criteria and, thereby,
as falling beyond the scope of Articles 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty. The advantage for undertakings fulfilling
these criteria is that they should normally not need to
notify their agreements.
However, from the first notice until today, the notices
have suffered from being of a general informative nature
rather than a legally binding nature. This means that
parties to an agreement or business practice can not fully
rely on them. This lack of “trust” to the legal certainty of
the notices has been further underlined by the jurisdiction
of the ECJ; although the Court has never actually opposed
the notice criteria express verbis, in several cases it has
disregarded the market share criteria laid down in the de
minimis notices. Until 1997, when the Commission adop-
ted and published its latest Notice on Agreements of
Minor Importance,23 the
market share threshold
was set at 5% for both
horizontal and vertical
agreements. In its ruling
in the joint appeal cases,
Pioneer vs. Commission
in 1983, the ECJ never-
theless found a market
share of 3.18% enough
for the agreement to
affect trade between
Member States apprec-
iably because the parties
were considered as mar-
ket leaders.24 From time-to-time, also the Commission has
disregarded its own de minimis criteria. For example, in
three cases from the 1980s, the Commission held that the
agreements in question fell under Article 81 [ex Article 85]
even though the parties to the agreements held only,
respectively, 2, 3 and 4% of the relevant markets.25
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3.1.2 Precision
The 1997-version of the Notice on Agreements of Minor
Importance has been criticised26 for its imprecise reference
to “territorial protection” as a criteria for an agreement
not to fall within the scope of the Notice. The Notice
indicates that the applicability of Article 81(1) cannot
be ruled out for vertical agreements which have as their
object to confer “territorial protection” on the
participating or third undertakings, and that this applies
even in cases where the aggregate market shares held by
all of the participating undertakings remain below the
thresholds.27
While it is well established by both Commission and
ECJ practice that absolute territorial protection resulting
in the prevention of otherwise legal parallel im- and
exports constitutes a
violation of Article
81(1) of the EC Treaty,
there also exist other,
“softer” forms of terri-
torial protection which
are generally permitted,
e.g. when an exclusive
distribution agreement
prohibits the parties
“active sales” in terri-
tories outside of their
own territory as long as
the agreement does not prohibit “passive sales.”28
It could be argued that while the formulation used in
the 1997 de minimis Notice is not directly misleading,
it does not tell the whole “truth” either; and it does not,
therefore, increase legal certainty for undertakings
considering to enter into agreements containing some
type of market exclusivity. The Commission will only
succeed in its strive towards increased legal certainty, if
it is precise in its guidelines. Otherwise it will be the
undertakings who have to carry the full risk, a risk they
would have no way of resolving easily, and that be
whether they are parties to a possible agreement or a
plaintiff or defendant in a court case about the legality
of a given agreement. This risk might even increase if the
parties’ possibility to notify agreements is abolished as
set out in the Proposal.29
3.1.3 Alternatives
But what are the alternatives? It has been suggested that
the only way the Commission could bind itself, the ECJ
and national decision-making bodies to the de minimis
criteria would be to adopt a “Block Negative Clearance
Regulation.”30 To do so, under Article 83 of the EC
Treaty, the Commission would require a similar
empowerment from the Council as it has received in
order to prepare and adopt block exemption regulations
pursuant to Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.31 Although
de minimis rules can be found in a number of the existing
block exemption regulations (see below about “safe
harbour” clauses), the Council has so far not adopted
(had the opportunity to adopt) any such general block
negative clearance regulation or empowered the
Commission to adopt such a regulation.
On the other hand, it could be argued that such a
regulation would be too general to ensure efficient and
sensible competition control: Block as well as individual
exemptions are tied to the prerequisites stipulated in
Article 81(3). Generally speaking, this means that an
agreement containing restrictions of competition must
produce technical or economic benefits, and that
consumers must obtain a fair share of these benefits, for
the agreement to be exempted. The assessment of whether
a given agreement meets these prerequisites normally
take all relevant factors into consideration: In the case
of a notification for an individual exemption, the
Commission (and the Courts) have to analyse not only
the legal issues, but also the economic environment
within which the agree-
ment is entered. Also in
the preparation of block
exemptions, the Com-
mission has analysed
both the legal and
economic effects which
are typical for the type
of agreements which are
covered by the given
block exemption. The
problem with a block
de minimis regulation
would be that it would have to cover all, or nearly all,
kinds of markets and types of business activities; and the
practice of both the Commission and the ECJ has shown
that in certain circumstances, such as in oligopolistic
markets or where new products with high future market
potential are concerned, it may be necessary to move
away from the de minimis criteria and apply Article 81(1)
and (2), thus prohibiting the agreement. In a number of
such cases, where the parties had notified their agreements
requesting both a negative clearance and an exemption,
the Commission further decided not even to grant an
exemption pursuant to Article 81(3).32
Hence, while it is not easy to find a solution that will
bring about the desired balance between improving
administrative efficiency and legal certainty, it would
appear to us that abolishing the present notification
system would only make the situation worse for the
undertakings. So far, the parties to an agreement have
been able to notify it to the Commission if they were in
doubt whether the agreement produces appreciable
effects on competition and trade between Member States.
By doing this, they could obtain guidance and certainty
from the Commission while, at the same time, reduce the
risk of being fined for an inadverted violation of Article
81(1).33 In the future, if the Commission’s proposal
comes into practice in its present form, the parties will
have to carry the full risk without a simple or
straightforward way of obtaining the required
guidance.34
Having said this, there would appear, however, to be
room for optimism: In its block exemption regulation
for vertical agreements adopted in late 1999,35 the
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Commission introduced a so-called “safe harbour
clause”, whereby vertical agreements can escape the
prohibition stipulated by Article 81(1) provided that
the agreement does not contain “hardcore” restrictions
(e.g. price fixing) and that the parties’ aggregate market
share does not exceed 30% of the relevant market.36 The
optimism is based on not only the contents and clearness
of the “safe harbour clause”, but in particular on the fact
that it is included in a regulation which is legally
binding for all decision-making bodies at both the
national and EU level.
3.2 Per Se Standards in EC Competition Law?
Before going into the discussion whether per se standards
exist in EC competition law and how this might affect
the attainment of legal certainty, the general concept
behind these rules should be briefly reviewed: The
concept of per se infringements of antitrust legislation
was developed through
the antitrust practice in
the United States as a
classification of busi-
ness conduct which is
not open to the rule-of-
reason balancing of the
arguments. In other
words, it was estab-
lished through juris-
prudence that certain
agreements (e.g. price
fixing and market divi-
sion) would infringe the
antitrust provisions of
the Sherman Act per se,
i.e. without an appraisal
of the economic or legal
circumstances of the given case being necessary to
establish their illegality.
Initially the ECJ took a fundamentally different
view. In Société Technique Minière vs. Maschinenbau
Ulm, it is stated that “as Article 85(1) [now Article 81(1)]
is based on an assessment of the effects of an agreement
from two angles of economic evaluation [i.e., the effects
on trade between Member States and the effects on
competition, ed. note], it cannot be interpreted as
introducing any kind of advance judgement […].
Therefore, an agreement whereby a producer entrusts
the sale of his product in a given area to a sole distributor
cannot automatically fall under the prohibition in Article
85(1) [now Article 81(1)].” 37
However, in later rulings, the ECJ has shown that it
is indeed ready to apply a per se standard. For example,
in Miller vs. Commission the ECJ held that “by its very
nature, a clause prohibiting exports constitutes a
restriction on competition [ed. emphasis]”. Furthermore,
it stated that “the fact that the supplier is not strict in
enforcing such prohibitions cannot establish that they
had no effect since their very existence may create a
visual and psychological background which satisfies
customers and contributes to a more or less rigorous
division of markets.”38 Even if the ECJ referred to
“visual and psychological” effects, this comes very
close to a per se prohibition: the Court clearly indicated
that the mere existence of such clauses is sufficient, as
they may create the necessary “visual and psychological
background”. If someone would ask why per se
prohibitions exist in United States antitrust law, the
arguments would certainly come very close to these.
An even clearer statement was given by the ECJ in
Ahlström and others vs. Commission, saying “by its
nature, a clause designed to prevent a buyer from
reselling or exporting goods he has bought is liable to
partition the markets [ed. emphasis]”.39 Even if one
might be able to find differences in the wording of the
statements (i.e. “the creation of a visual and psychological
effects” vs. “by its nature”), it will still be hard even for
competition law experts to explain any real difference
in the meaning of the statements.40 All in all, it would
appear to be safe to say
that Community policy
on these questions is
by no means obvious.
The Proposal focu-
ses on administrative
reform through decen-
tralisation of control
powers and powers to
grant exemptions pur-
suant to Article 81(3)
of the EC Treaty. The
proposal does not, how-
ever, provide any clear
indications on how to
solve uncertainties as
those mentioned above,
at least not in the short
to medium term. There would therefore appear to be
grounds to argue that before adopting the proposed
regulation on reforming the implementation of Articles
81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, the EU legislative bodies
should focus on adopting clear rules and guidelines
through which contracting parties will be able to obtain
guidance for secure self-assessment of potential
transactions’ compatibility with EC competition rules
which might affect trade between and within several EU
Member States, and which are not covered in a clear way
in the specialised block exemption regulations or
individual decisions adopted by the Commission or the
ECJ.
3.3 The Rule of Reason
In its 1999 White Paper, the Commission clearly stated
that it opposes the adoption of a test of reasonableness
in Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty.41 Much has been
written on this issue, and especially British literature
favours the consideration of pro- and anti-competitive
effects under Article 81(1).42 On the other hand, German
authors strongly disapprove.43 In that sense, the
Commission’s intention to take a clear position is very
welcome. However, a closer view of the Commission’s
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approach gives an impression that its efforts in this
regard have been made only half-heartedly. Admitting
that it has adopted a rule-of-reason approach in some of
its decisions, and that this approach was confirmed by
the ECJ, the Commission states that “if a more systematic
use were made under Article [81(1)] of an analysis of the
pro- and anti-competitive aspects of a restrictive
agreement, Article [81(3)] would be cast aside.”44
The problem with the above formulation is the word
“systematic”. Does the Commission want to have “just
a bit” of a rule-of-reason? Are the cases, where a rule-of-
reason approach was taken, still valid? The confusion of
an observer – or a legal advisor for an undertaking – can
only grow when considering a Commission decision
adopted after the publication of the 1999 White Paper:
In Inntrepreneur and Spring, the Commission found that
certain agreements would rather promote competition
than they would contribute to market closure.45 This is
clearly a balancing of pro- and anti-competitive effects
of the agreements in question, and the decision goes
further than the approaches admitted by the Commission
in its 1999 White Paper, all of which were related to
intellectual and industrial property rights and market
entry. With formulations like these, the Commission
risks playing into the hands of its critics, i.e., making it
clear that its approach to evaluate agreements is not
clear, thus strengthening the arguments against
introducing the proposed reform at this stage.
4. Conclusion
While recognising the need for a general reform of the
implementation of the EC competition rules, it would
appear to us that the time is not yet ripe for the type of
reform proposed by the Commission. Rather, we believe
that the Commission’s efforts should focus on creating
the basis for such a reform by adopting clear guidelines
and/or binding legislation that secure the legal certainty
of the undertakings that have to operate under the EC
competition law framework.
We have argued that consistency and coherence in
the understanding and application of the competition
rules are a prerequisite to ensure legal certainty which,
in turn, is a prerequisite for the implementation of the
Commission’s plans to decentralise EC competition
law application: In the 1999 White Paper, the
Commission states that national competition authorities
and courts will face mainly disputes in areas were the law
has been well established in the past 40 years.46 While
this might be true for a number of cases, it is very likely
that these decision-making bodies will also be faced
with many cases and questions, for which there is no
clear jurisprudence. The cases and questions will
originate not only from the uncertainties described
above, but also from the continuous developments of
market structures, business practices and technology,
etc.
We question whether to rely on the Article 234
procedure (on preliminary rulings) is an appropriate and
efficient way to resolve these problems. The length of
time that will pass from the time a potential claimant is
subjected to an anti-competitive agreement or practice
till it is brought before the national court, questions to
the ECJ are formulated and a reply is received, and the
national court eventually rules on the issue – and the
costs connected with this – will prevent all but the
financially strongest from even initiating a case. Policy-
and lawmakers should not be afraid of learning from the
American experiences, which tell us that leaving it up
to the parties in trials before the courts is, summa
summarum not the best way to ensure efficient and
effective control of fair competition and, thus, legal
certainty. To this comes a number of additional factors,
namely differences in political and legal traditions
(including the willingness of national courts to request
preliminary rulings from the ECJ) among not only the
existing EU Member States but also the future new
Member States.
The de minimis problem is by no means an issue of
minor importance, and the question of rule-of-reason
inquiries and per se standards will appear on a regular
basis as long as parties are not sure which arguments are
acceptable. While the introduction of “safe harbour”
clauses into binding block exemption regulations is a
big step in the right direction and the body of binding
legislation generally grows, there is in our opinion still
a way to go till a sufficient degree of legal certainty has
been achieved which can create the basis for the
implementation of a reform of the nature proposed by
the Commission.
_______________
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